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QUESTIONING EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY IN AN ECONOMIC STATE OF 
EMERGENCY 
Alan Greene
1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global economic crisis that crystallised in September 2008 sent reverberations 
throughout the world. The magnitude of this ‘economic state of emergency’ was dramatically 
described by UK Prime Minister David Cameron as the ‘economic equivalent of war’.2  
Conceptualising an economic crisis as tantamount to war or a state of emergency is not, 
however, a 21
st
 Century development. Since the early decades of the 20
th
 Century, and even 
before that,
3
 political rhetoric compared economic crises to military threats and therefore 
perceived or represented by government rhetoric as necessitating an emergency response.
4
 
This article presents a legal, as opposed to political or economic, perspective on these 
‘emergency’ responses to economic crises. The aim of this article is not to question the 
economic merits or efficacy of these economic measures, but to challenge from a legal 
constitutionalist perspective the validity of arguments pertaining to the manner in which such 
emergency measures are enacted. Specifically, can equivalence be drawn between economic 
crises and national security crises? Focus therefore is on the processes surrounding the 
introduction of these economic measures rather than the substantive content of the measures 
themselves. 
 
In particular, this article questions whether the suppositions that underpin the standard 
national security emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the 
executive in times of emergency can be assumed for economic crises. Part I introduces this 
concept of emergency government in a period of crisis, emphasising the consolidation of 
power in the executive when confronting a threat to national security.  Fundamental aspects 
                                                 
1
 Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School. I’d like to thank the anonymous reviewers, Fiona de Londras, Aoife 
Nolan, and Natasa Mavronicola for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I presented this paper at the 
Durham Law School Staff Seminar Series, and the IACL-AIDC World Congress of Constitutional Law in June 
2014. I am grateful to the participants at these events for their feedback.   
2‘Debt Crisis: CBY Conference as it happened- November 19, 2012’ The Daily Telegraph (19 November 2012) 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/debt-crisis-live/9687330/Debt-crisis-CBI-Conference-as-it-
happened-November-19-2012.html (Last accessed, 10 December 2014).  
3
 See J Reynolds, ‘The Political Economy of States of Emergency’ 14 Oregon Review of International Law 85. 
4
 WE  Scheuerman, ‘The Economic State of Emergency’ (1999-2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1869, 1870-
1872, 1878-1879. Economic crises have also been compared to natural disasters, with the US Supreme Court 
drawing this equivalence in Home Building and Loan Association v Blaisdell 290 US 423.  
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of the emergency paradigm – temporariness, necessity, and expedience – are introduced; and 
the classic defence of this ‘executive supremacy’ is then explained as due to the speed at 
which the executive is able to react to a crisis, and the expertise the executive possess in 
issues of national security making them best placed to decide what response is necessary.  
 
Part II presents an illustrative discussion of economic crises being subject to emergency 
responses similar to crises to national security. Historical examples from the 20th Century 
will be sketched before providing more recent instances from the 2008 economic crisis. 
Ireland’s response to its acute economic crisis in particular shall be proffered as an example 
of an emergency response and how there is a close correlation between the manner in which 
states have responded to economic and national security crises.  
 
Part III then challenges this legislative deference to the executive in a period of economic 
emergency. This shall be done firstly by questioning the concept of executive expertise on 
economic issues, and secondly by challenging the ‘necessity’ of such economic measures. 
This article concludes by contending instead that arguments of necessity in an economic 
crisis are arguments about expedient government and law-making. However, as the issue of 
speed is not one unique to economic crises but is endemic throughout the regulation of the 
everyday capitalist world, it cannot amount to a normative argument for departing from the 
status quo. If such arguments are acceded to in the name of speed alone then the result will be 
a permanent change to the legal system rather than an exceptional measure in a period of 
crisis. Furthermore, many responses to economic crises do not envisage a return to the status 
quo that existed before the economic state of emergency as aspects of this prior status quo 
were responsible for the crisis. Economic states of emergency thus usher in a ‘new 
normalcy’. While this key justification of the emergency paradigm – that  such exceptional 
measures are temporary – is one that is being increasingly challenged in the wider literature 
on emergency powers today, this article contends that the temporariness of emergency 
powers is a particularly problematic assumption when applied to economic states of 
emergency.  
 
1. STATES OF EMERGENCY: EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY 
Emergency is a term used in legal norms, political rhetoric, and lay understanding to cover a 
multitude of different crises and phenomena of varying magnitudes. In a generalist sense, 
states of emergency are declared by governments or emergency services in order to facilitate 
3 
 
an expedited response of an exceptional nature to a perceived threat or crisis. Legal sources 
giving effect to this ‘emergency paradigm’ recognise this element of urgency with the 
ordinary controls on state power relinquished to enable a swift response to the crisis at hand 
once a state of emergency is declared. Analogously, a de jure state of emergency may not be 
declared but the state or its actors may respond to a crisis in a manner similar to that in which 
they would have reacted had an emergency been declared.
5
 These de facto emergencies 
mirror closely, both in the response taken and particularly in the political rhetoric justifying 
their introduction, the assumptions that underpin an official declaration of an emergency.
6
 
Consequently, the fact that a state has not declared a state of emergency is not conclusive that 
it is not utilising an ‘emergency paradigm’. The phenomena that trigger such emergency 
responses vary widely: from war and terrorist attacks, to natural disasters, and, as this article 
contends, economic crises; nevertheless, it is the case that the majority of academic scrutiny 
operates on instances pertaining to national security specifically.
7
 In particular, numerous 
writers have drawn attention to the proper functioning of the separation of powers in such 
emergencies and the resultant executive supremacy that occurs as a response to these national 
security crises.
8
  
 
Regardless of the phenomenon that triggers it, an emergency response should be one not 
permissible during ‘normalcy’ as it is the constraints on power that ordinarily exist that 
requires the de jure declaration of an emergency. Once an emergency is declared, the relevant 
state actors are liberated from these constraints and free to act accordingly. Often, however, 
the constraints that are relaxed or abandoned imbue the political, legal, and constituent 
                                                 
5
 N Questiaux,  ’Study  of  the  implications  for  human  rights  of  recent  developments concerning  situations  
known  as  states  of  siege  or  emergency’  UNESC, E/CN.4/Sub2/1982/ 15 (27 July 1982) 26.   
6
 ibid. De facto emergencies are problematic from a constitutionalist perspective as they bypass the shielding 
effect of the emergency paradigm – quarantining exceptional measures to exceptional situations – leaving only 
their role as a sword – as an enabler of state power. See A Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The 
Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12(11) German Law Journal 
1764, 1765-1766.    
7
 See e.g. E Posner and A Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security Liberty and the Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2007); F de Londras and F Davis, ‘Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing 
Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms’ (2010) 30 OJLS 19; B Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: 
Preserving Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism (Yale University Press 2006); H  Fenwick  and  G Phillipson, 
‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty and  Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism 
Law and Beyond’ (2011) 46(4)  McGill Law Journal 863 to name but a select few. 
8
 Posner and Vermeule ibid; de Londras and Davis ibid; Ackerman ibid; J Lobel ‘Emergency Powers and the 
Decline of Liberalism’ (1989) 98(7) Yale Law Journal 1385; Mark Tushnet, ‘Controlling Executive Power in 
the War on Terrorism’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Reivew 2673; C Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Emergency Powers: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies(Transaction Publishers 2002). 
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identity of a state; i.e. in a liberal-democratic state with respect for the rule of law and human 
rights it is these very ideals that may be slackened or derogated from altogether. The 
unpalatable nature of emergency powers is tempered by their assumed temporariness: once 
the threat is defeated so too will the exceptional measures disappear.
9
 The emergency 
paradigm is thus based upon the assumption that one can separate emergency from 
‘normalcy;’ with exceptional crises and responses to such crises falling into the former 
category, quarantined from the ordinary phenomena and powers that define the status quo.
10
 
Emergency is the outlier to this normalcy and once the threat is defeated, so too will the 
exceptional emergency powers be relinquished.  
 
This assumption of a separation between normalcy and emergency is one that is increasingly 
challenged in the literature, however. The idea that we are instead living in a permanent state 
of emergency where exceptional powers are no longer temporary, has arguably become the 
dominant paradigm. Threats such as terrorism that a state faces today are, or at least 
represented to be, no longer temporary.
11
 Furthermore, the responses to such crises have also 
changed. Emergencies, today are something to be managed by the state or prevented in the 
first instance, as distinct from reacting to in a ‘fire-fighting manner’ as the classic 
understanding of a state of emergency conceptualises them.
12
 These crises therefore are 
transformative; effecting permanent change, with restoration of the status quo or ‘normalcy’ 
either perpetually suspended or rejected as the goal.
13
 That conceded, while this temporary 
nature of emergency powers may now be questionable, these exceptional measures are 
                                                 
9
 Rossiter ibid 306. 
10
 O Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?’ (2000) 112 Yale 
Law Journal 1011, 1069-1096. 
11
 Gross ibid. Oren Gross argues that the four classic degrees of separation between normalcy and emergency – 
us v them, domestic v international, spatial separation, and temporal separation – are no longer tenable in 
modernity. Mark Neocleous argues that ‘permanent state of emergency’ has now become the dominant mantra 
of the left and the libertarian right. M Neocleous, ‘The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to 
“Permanent Emergency”’ (2006) 31 Alternatives 191, 195. I have argued elsewhere that the blurring of the lines 
between normalcy and emergency is not wholly explainable by the objective nature of the threats that face the 
state but through a subjective labelling of certain threats as ‘emergency’ that would not have been labelled and 
treated as such in the past. See generally Greene (n 6).  
12
 O Gross and F Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (CUP 2006) 22; 
A Greene, ‘Shielding the State of Emergency: Organised Crime in Ireland and the State’s Response’ (2011) 
62(3) NILQ 249, 252-254. 
13
 Thus McCormick argues that the key difference between Carl Schmitt’s conception of ‘commissarial’ versus 
‘sovereign’ dictatorship is that the former is temporary and reactionary whereas the latter is permanent and 
transformative:  JP McCormick, ‘The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency 
Powers’ (1997) 10 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 163, 165-167; See Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship 
(Polity Press 2013).  
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additionally represented as justified on the consequentialist grounds that they are necessary to 
respond to the threat at hand.  
 
Necessity: the justification for exceptionality  
In national security emergencies, the sacrifice of constitutionalist principles such as human 
rights, the rule of law, and ordinary democratic procedures are represented as being 
unpalatable but unavoidable decisions that need to be taken in order to respond to a threat at 
hand.
14
 However, while such measures are unpalatable, they are nevertheless represented as 
preferable to a failure not to act and not confront the emergency. In essence, emergency 
situations present an example of a duress of circumstances that requires a decision-maker to 
choose between comparably unpalatable courses of action.   
 
This idea of a constraint of choices in a period of emergency is reflective of the concept of 
necessity in both philosophy and the criminal law. The classic thought experiment of 
necessity in philosophy is that of the run-away trolley, where the subject is asked whether it 
is morally right for a person to change the direction of a railway trolley in order to save five 
innocent people by directing it into the path of one innocent person thus killing them 
instead.
15
 The subject in the trolley problem could possibly avail of the criminal law the 
defence of necessity which potentially arises where:  
 
the defendant could have complied with the letter of the law, but decided not to do so because 
he thought that such compliance would in all probability result in a harm or evil as great or 
greater than that which would ensue from doing (or omitting to do) what prima facie is 
prohibited (or commanded).
16
  
 
                                                 
14
This is recognised be international human rights treaties such as Article 4 ICCPR and Article 15 ECHR which 
allow contracting states to derogate from their ordinary human rights obligations ‘to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation’.   
15
 JJ Thomson, ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’ (1976) 59(2) The Monist 204; JJ Thompson, 
‘The Trolley Problem’ (1985) 94 Yale Law Journal 1395; M Otsuka, ‘Double Effect, Triple Effect and the 
Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases’ (2008) 20(1) Utilitas 92. 
16
 PR Glazebrook, ‘The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law’ (1972) 30 Cambridge LJ 87, 88. The defence 
of necessity in criminal law operates to justify an individual’s actions. See the judgment of Brooke LJ in Re A 
(Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 148 who held that the separation of the 
conjoined twins and resultant death of one twin would be justified as distinct from excused. Brooke LJ’s 
judgment is not, however, a statement of the ratio decidendi of the case as all judges in the Court of Appeal used 
different justifications for ultimately deciding that the twins should be separated. 
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With necessity, often the idea of a choice may be constrained to such an extent that it is 
merely notional, with the actor asserting that they ‘had no choice’ but to pursue the course of 
action they had taken.
17
 Nevertheless, there is still always a choice, although it may be one 
between two comparable evils with the choice being the ‘lesser of two evils’.18  
 
The use of torture and the attempts by some states’ criminal justice systems to excuse or 
justify such behaviour, notwithstanding the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture in 
international law, illustrates how criminal law and national security concepts of necessity can 
overlap. In Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel the Israel Supreme Court held 
that a person prosecuted for using torture may be able to rely on the defence of necessity.
19
 A 
similar sentiment was echoed by US officials tasked with issuing advice to CIA interrogators 
regarding their liability for so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ by relying on §3.02 
(1)(a) of the US Model Penal Code which states that:  
 
Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another 
is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is 
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) 
neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defences dealing 
with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification 
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
20
 
 
Attempts to justify exceptional and illegal measures such as torture therefore rely on the 
claim that they are necessary, using consequentialist or utilitarian forms of ethical reasoning. 
Such consequentialist arguments become more pronounced depending upon the severity of 
harm sought to be avoided by the exceptional response. ‘Ticking time bomb scenarios’ or 
other thought experiments seek to stress-test the values a state clings to in a time of 
emergency further, including the validity of absolute rights like the prohibition on torture.
21
 
                                                 
17
See  FMc Auley and JP McCutcheon, Criminal Liability: A Grammar (Roundhall Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 
779-801 
18
 United States v Holmes (1842) 26 Fed Cas 360. 
19
 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel HC 5100/94 (Israel 1999). 
20
 J Bybee, ‘Memorandum for A. Gonzales… [Re:] Standards for Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC 
2340-2340A. United States, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, (1 August 2002). 
21
 See N Mavronicola, ‘What is an ‘Absolute Right?’ Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) HRLR 723; O Gross, ‘Are Torture Warrants 
Warranted?’ (2004) 88 Minnesota Law Review 1481, 1497 - 1500. Gross’ piece is a response to Alan 
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‘Ticking time bomb scenarios’ ‘ratchet’ up the harm and its imminence that could potentially 
be avoided to such magnitude as to seek to out-weigh the deontological justification of such 
absolute norms.
22
 States of emergency thus accentuate the notion of a constrained choice 
further by placing pressure on the time a person has to make a decision. Emergency protocols 
likewise streamline the ordinary decision-making procedures enabling individuals such as the 
emergency services to respond rapidly.
23
 
 
This link between necessity and emergency powers in a crisis of national security is not 
limited to legal or philosophical debates surrounding the appropriateness of torture. Scholars 
of emergency powers have debated the legality and the value of such legality of exceptional 
powers in general, and whether emergency powers exist or should exist within or outside the 
law.
24
 As brusquely put by Abraham Lincoln in justifying his dictatorial actions on the eve of 
the US Civil War:  
 
The law is made for the state not the state for the law. If the circumstances are such that a 
choice must be made between the two, it is the law which must be sacrificed to the state. 
Salus Populi suprema lex esto.
25
  
 
National security states of emergency reflect the concept of necessity with decision-makers 
justifying their choices on the grounds that such action, despite its unpalatable or even illegal 
nature must nevertheless be taken in order to alleviate a greater harm that would occur were 
the status quo maintained. This representation of necessity must not be taken at face value, 
however. Giorgio Agamben stresses the naivety of theories that assume necessity is an 
objective fact.
26
 Agamben instead asserts that the concept of necessity is ‘an entirely 
subjective one, relative to the aim that one wants to achieve.’27 The language of emergency is 
a powerful and emotive force that can shape the legal discourse around the necessity of such 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dershowitz’s torture warrants proposal. See A Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’ in S levinson, Torture: A 
Collection (OUP 2004) 257. 
22
 Gross, ibid. 
23
 See text to n 130 below for a discussion of how ‘time compression theory’ is challenging liberal democracy’s 
ability to react expeditiously to problems facing the state.  
24
 See e.g. See D Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v Dicey: Are states of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal 
Order?’(2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2005. 
25
Rossiter (n 8) 12. 
26
 G Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press 2005) 29-30. 
27
 ibid. 
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a response.
28
 This rhetoric is not merely reactive – describing objectively ascertainable truths 
– but instead creates the lens, or ‘frame’ through which others view the debate and thus 
shapes the contours of the debate, generally.
29
  The invocation of the rhetoric of ‘emergency’ 
or ‘necessity’ to a political debate, particularly when this is done by the executive thus sets 
the parameters for the debate, creating a much more persuasive narrative for their chosen 
course of action.
30
 Invoking the rhetoric of emergency therefore emphasises the necessity of 
the response taken by the decision maker, thus cloaking the political ideology underlying the 
responses taken in a veil of objectivity. 
 
The subjective nature of the labelling of a crisis as warranting an emergency response must 
be taken into account; however, this too should not be over-stated. What gives necessity an 
objective component is that the aim to be achieved by undertaking the measure is one that 
anyone would agree ought to be achieved if they found themselves in a given situation. 
Agamben’s critique of necessity should not result in an abandonment of the concept of 
necessity in general but instead it should focus a more critical scrutiny upon the decision-
maker who invokes the rhetoric of emergency in the first instance. Invariably, in crises of 
national security it is the executive that is this initial decision maker. The executive therefore 
acts while the legislature and courts defer.  
 
The emergency paradigm and executive dominance 
A quintessential aspect of the emergency paradigm is that it is the executive that acts in a 
period of extreme crisis. Emergency situations amplify a tension at the heart of the separation 
powers theory: the prevention of a consolidation of power in one branch of government and 
potential abuse that could arise from this; and the facilitation of a state structure that is 
appropriately able to exercise its powers in a timely and efficient manner.
31
 Eric Barendt, for 
                                                 
28
 This can cause increased popular support for a strong response as a result of a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. 
See B Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Harvard University 
Press 1990) 34.  
29
 See for example, RR Krebs and PT Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political 
Rhetoric’ (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 25; D Kahnamen and A Tversky, ‘Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ (1979) 47(2) Econometrica 263. 
30
 ibid; O Gross and F Ní Aoláin, ‘The Rhetoric of War: Words, Conflict and Categorization Post- 9/11’ (2014) 
24 (2) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-47. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2530789, 5-7. 
31
 C Montesquieu, The spirit of laws (T Nugent  tr, Continental Press 1949); J Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government (first published 1689,CB MacPherson ed., Hackett Publishing Company, 1980) 84-88; Eric 
Barendt, ‘Separation of powers and constitutional government’ [1995] Public Law 599, 601. 
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example, argues that John Locke’s theory of the separation of powers was as much concerned 
with government expediency as it was with the prevention of tyranny.
32
 Locke’s recognition 
of the requirement of expediency and exceptionality in government is most clearly 
concretised in his concept of the Prerogative of the Crown: ‘the power of the King to do good 
without a rule and sometimes even against it.’33 Locke’s model of a separation of powers thus 
illustrates the tensions at play when attempting to curtail absolutism and promote expediency; 
tensions which continue to manifest today, particularly in a period of crisis. In such crises, 
expediency and perceived necessity tends to outweigh concerns about absolutism, and a 
consolidation of power takes place in the executive branch of government at the expense of 
the legislature and the judiciary. The legislature and judiciary instead defer to the executive in 
a period of emergency that stems from a national security crisis. Referring to the United 
States’ presidential model, Mark Tushnet notes that ‘when government is unified… in the 
hands of the same party… Congress will probably authorise anything… the President asks’.34 
The parliamentary democratic system of states such as the United Kingdom or Ireland would 
suggest that legislative oversight would be even less of a control seeing as the executive 
axiomatically dominates the legislature due to their fused nature.
35
 The separation of powers 
theory, particularly in parliamentary democracies, therefore should not be explained solely in 
terms of a strict categorisation and allocation of functions or personnel between the three 
branches but rather by understanding the aforementioned rationale behind the separation of 
powers: as a brake on and an enabler of government expediency. 
 
Deferring to the Executive 
According to Aileen Kavanagh, ‘judicial deference occurs when judges assign varying 
degrees of weight to the judgments of the elected branches, out of respect for their superior 
expertise, competence or democratic legitimacy’.36 Deference is a variable spectrum, with the 
degree of deference accorded to the initial decision-maker malleable according factors such 
as the subject matter of the decision and the respect accorded to the decision-maker.
37
 While 
                                                 
32
 Barendt, for example, notes Locke’s endorsing of Parliament’s need for a permanent body to enforce laws it 
had created as Parliament often did not sit once it had passed laws. See Barendt ibid 602. 
33
 Locke (n 31) 84-88.  
34
 Tushnet, (n 8) 2679. 
35
 de Londras and Davis (n 7) 34-37 (per de Londras). 
36
 A Kavanagh, ‘Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory’ (2010) 126(2) LQR 222,223. 
37
 See e.g. F Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] EHRLR 125, 125-126; P 
Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law (CUP 2012) Ch 1.  
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this article is concerned with legislative – as distinct from judicial – deference to the 
executive during economic crises, Kavanagh’s definition is nevertheless useful as it presents 
an accurate synopsis of the relevant justifications for deference: that the branch one is 
deferring to has superior expertise, institutional competence, or legitimacy than the branch 
that is deferring.  
 
National security is a field in which the institutional competence and expertise of the 
judiciary is represented as being weak.
38
 Furthermore, the lack of democratic legitimacy 
weighs heavily on the judiciary when assessing national security implications, again resulting 
in the deference to the political branches. Democratic legitimacy cannot, however, displace 
legislative oversight of executive decisions on national security issues. On the contrary, the 
trend is that such legislative affirmation is becoming more important to legitimise executive 
action. Thus while the UK government may undertake military action without legislative 
approval, it has been suggested by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown that it is highly 
unlikely that it would ever do so in future.
39
 That the executive has less democratic 
legitimacy than the legislature is seen by the lesser hesitancy judiciaries have in invalidating 
executive orders that are deemed to infringe on human rights than legislation that similarly 
infringes, even in jurisdictions where the judiciary have the power to strike down laws as 
unconstitutional.
40
  
 
Notwithstanding the legislature’s superior democratic legitimacy, the executive is 
nevertheless considered to be best placed to take decisions on national security, particularly 
in a time of crises. The executive is the branch most capable of taking expedient decisions 
due to a lack of formalist decision-making procedures that can slow down such processes in 
the legislature and particularly in the courts. The executive may also be privy to sensitive or 
                                                 
38
 CCSU v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 412 (Lord Diplock). 
39
 S Issacharoff, ‘Political Safeguards in Democracies at War’ 29 OJLS 189, 204. The defeat in Parliament of 
the UK Government’s motion to militarily intervene in Syria’s civil war on 29 August 2013 corroborates 
Brown’s assertion on this point. See N Watt and N Hopkins, ‘Cameron forced to rule out British attack on Syria 
after MPs reject motion’ The Guardian (29 August 2013), available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/29/cameron-british-attack-syria-mps (last accessed, 3 April 2014). 
One year later in September 2014, the UK Parliament, passed a Government-backed proposal, authorising air-
strikes against targets of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) operating in parts of Iraq. See HC Deb 26 September 
2014, vol 585 cols 1255-1360.  
40
.This can be seen by the decline in the use of prerogative powers by the UK government in favour of 
statutorily conferred powers that attract democratic legitimacy. See M Elliott, J Beatson and M Matthews, 
Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's Administrative Law Text and Materials (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 
116-123.  
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specialist information that the other branches of government do not have access to and ought 
not to have access to due to its sensitive or secret nature the release of which to the public 
domain may hamper the emergency response effort.
41
 With both the judiciary and the 
legislature operating in public they become inappropriate fora for the handling of such 
material. This ‘expertise’ of the executive therefore creates an additional incentive for the 
branches of government to defer or acquiesce to the executive’s assessment of what should be 
done in a period of crisis.
42
  
 
Executive supremacy and the assumption of temporariness? 
Emergency theories, however, attempt to reassure us that parliamentary deference in times of 
a national security crisis is an exceptional response to an exceptional crisis. It is a temporary 
aberration that will dissipate once normalcy is restored. Parliamentary ineffectiveness or 
acquiescence to the executive is not, however, wholly containable to emergency situations. 
The decline of the influence of parliaments can be seen in the everyday workings of the 
modern state with Andrew Moravcsik arguing that ‘the late 20th Century has been the period 
of the decline of parliaments and the rise of courts, public administrations and the core 
executive’.43 This was noted as far back as 1963 with the editorial of The Political Quarterly 
lamenting the UK Parliament ‘losing in popular esteem, losing the degree of control it should 
exercise over the government, failing to adapt itself to the complexity of the tasks the 
quickened tempo of modern life has thrust upon it.’44 Parliaments have themselves facilitated 
this decline, delegating broad regulatory powers upon administrative organs entrusted, due to 
their expertise, to unpack in greater specificity and complexity the norms that ought to be 
applied in their specific sphere of competence. Parliamentary decline is therefore endemic in 
normalcy too. This ‘technocratisation’ of decision-making has accelerated since then, in 
particular in relation to financial regulation.
45
 Economic transactions and their resultant 
consequences can reverberate around the globe almost instantaneously today. Reactions to 
stock market developments can occur at a much more rapid pace than ever before. 
Globalisation has resulted in an inter-connected world where states’ economies are 
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intertwined, interdependent, and therefore feel the effects of fluctuations in each other. Under 
this ‘compression theory’ the globalised world is a much smaller place where economic 
interactions happen at an ever increasing pace.
46
 Furthermore, a globalised economy requires 
a similarly globalised regulatory framework, beyond national parliaments and capable of 
responding in an expedient fashion. Expedient decision-making thus appears to be endemic to 
economic decision-making, even in normalcy. However, when economic decision-making is 
conceptualised as being undertaken in a period of emergency (whether de facto or de jure), 
the necessity of expedience is arguably compounded further. It is to these ‘economic states of 
emergency’ that this article now turns to.  
 
2. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF EMERGENCY 
The early years of the 21st Century have been dominated by two distinct international 
emergencies. The attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington DC on 11 September 2001, and the resultant ‘war on terror’ shaped international 
relations in the subsequent years. The global economic crisis that then crystallised in 2008 led 
to the creation of new legal norms and emergency responses by various states and 
international organisations. As stated previously, however, equating an economic crisis to a 
state of emergency is not a 21
st
 Century development. Classic national security emergency 
responses such as martial law or state of siege were not suitable for economic crises,
47
 yet the 
concepts and assumptions that underpinned martial law and state of siege were ,nevertheless, 
mirrored in the responses taken to economic crises. Indeed, such was their success and 
malleability that these emergency powers came to surpass the need to declare martial law or 
state of siege. Thus the state of emergency became the predominant response mechanism for 
war, natural disaster or economic emergency.
48
 
 
Economic emergencies in the 20
th
 Century 
The events and aftermath of World War I demonstrates the emergency paradigm’s perceived 
capacity to accommodate economic crises. France’s state of siege, for example, which was 
designed to cope with military matters, was abandoned in favour of a broad delegation of 
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legislative power to the executive to tackle the conditions of ‘severe economic distress’ in 
1924.
49
 Germany too found its economy ravaged by World War I and the harsh conditions of 
the Treaty of Versailles. Faced with a crippled economy and hyperinflation, on 12 October 
1922 a ‘necessary’ presidential order was passed without parliamentary input or approval 
forbidding speculation in foreign currencies using the now infamous emergency powers 
clause contained in Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.
50
 Rossiter describes this utilisation 
of Article 48 to deal with economic crises as the ‘entering wedge’ on the road to fascism.51 
Article 48 was clearly broader in scope than the old German state of war which axiomatically 
was designed to deal with armed conflicts and had nothing to do with economic issues. The 
use of Article 48 to deal with economic crisis in Weimar Germany illustrated the problems 
that can arise from a separation of powers in a period of emergency. Given the utter failure of 
the legislature in the 1930s, due primarily to it being composed of diametrically opposing 
factions (communists vs national socialists) both committed to the destruction of the liberal 
democratic order, Article 48 and the vast discretion to rule by executive decree it enabled was 
to play a key role in governing the Weimar Republic until Hitler’s ascension to power.52 
 
Economic states of emergency have also been experienced by the United States, with the 
Great Depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal programme representing an archetypal 
example.
53
 From the outset of his presidency, Roosevelt drew equivalence between war and 
economic crisis and made clear he intended to tackle the Great Depression with strong 
executive power; in much the same way as Lincoln fought the Civil War. In Roosevelt’s 
inaugural speech he declared that he would ‘ask the Congress for the one remaining 
instrument to meet the crisis: broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as 
great as the power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe’.54 On 
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6 March 1933, 48 hours after assuming office, Roosevelt utilised the Trading with the Enemy 
Act 1917, specifically designed to meet only wartime exigencies, to declare a bank holiday 
and force the closure of financial institutions.
55
 On 9 March 1933 Roosevelt signed the 
Emergency Banking Act into law which restructured these financial institutions to ensure that 
viable institutions could then reopen once the bank holiday was lifted.
56
 This act also created 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and introduced into the US the 
‘temporary’ deposit insurance fund to protect depositors in financial institutions should those 
institutions go into liquidation.
57
 This temporary fund became permanent and the FDIC 
employed an ‘essentiality test’ to assess the systemic importance of a distressed institution, 
with the ultimate goal being to prevent systemic risks.
58
 In other words, it was the first 
recognition of the concept of financial institutions that were ‘too big to fail’ and out of 
necessity needed to be rescued. Indeed, such has been the impact of the FDIC that the notion 
of ‘too big to fail’ has been labelled a ‘perennial issue.’59 Roosevelt’s actions thus paved the 
way for emergency powers in the form of executive action to be applied in the USA in 
instances beyond the original conception of emergency as a military phenomenon.
60
 
 
Roosevelt’s declaration of National Emergency in 1933 to deal with the ‘Great Depression’ 
remained in existence long after his death. A report by the Special Committee on the 
Termination of the National Emergency, chaired by US Senators Charles Mathias and Frank 
Church in 1973 (Church-Mathias Committee) commences with the line: ‘Since March 9, 
1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency.’61 In fact, along 
with Roosevelt’s declaration, there were actually three other simultaneous states of 
emergency in existence: President Truman’s declaration to deal with the Korean War; and 
two declarations by President Nixon: firstly to deal with a strike by postal service workers, 
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and secondly to meet an international monetary crisis.
62
 These emergency decrees gave effect 
to 470 provisions of federal law which, according to the authors, conferred enough powers on 
the President to be able to rule the country without reference to normal constitutional 
processes.
63
 The US’ experience of tackling economic crises with emergency-type responses 
therefore illustrates the difficulties of keeping such measures temporary. Instead, it is 
indicative of the tendency of exceptional responses to seep into normalcy.  
 
The 2008 Financial Crisis: The EU Reaction 
Similar to the manner in which economic crises in the US paved the way for permanent 
changes, the post-2008 financial crisis had a comparable effect on the European Union (EU) 
and its member states. The basis of the Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT),
64
 Europe’s principal 
structural change in response to the economic crisis is Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 
 
Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial 
assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the 
European Parliament of the decision taken.
65
 
 
In this regard, the EU legally, as well as rhetorically, equates the financial crisis to ‘natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its [a state’s] control.’ The FCT effects a 
permanent change to the manner in which Eurozone states set their macroeconomic budgets. 
The underlying rationale behind the FCT thus assumes that there were fundamental flaws in 
these budgetary processes prior to its enactment that needed to be addressed and prevented 
from re-occurring in future. Here, however, we see a dichotomy between the classical 
understanding of phenomena that trigger emergencies and economic crises. Whereas natural 
disasters may be ‘exceptional circumstances beyond its [a state’s] control’, economic crises 
are often seen as a result of the state’s actions or its mismanagement of the economy. 
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Responses are therefore not just fire-fighting but also preventative and future-oriented in 
order to prevent such mismanagement from occurring again. A return to the status quo or 
‘normalcy’ that existed prior to the crisis is therefore not desirable as this ‘normalcy’ is itself 
represented as being part of the problem. This is true too of the manner in which states 
respond to terrorist threats, no longer merely reacting but also seeking to prevent future 
attacks from happening by ‘defending further up the field.’66 Thus ‘normalcy’ in the sense of 
the status quo that existed before the crisis – be it economic or terroristic in nature – will not 
be restored, nor, as this rhetoric represents, should it. Former US Vice-President Dick Cheney 
succinctly describes this post 9/11 world of perpetual terrorist and perpetual counter-terrorist 
prevention measures as the ‘new normalcy’ and the same is applicable for the post Euro-crisis 
EU.
67
 The financial crisis therefore has not been so much an emergency for the EU 
warranting temporary fire-fighting responses. Instead it was more akin to a ‘constitutional 
moment’ or, at the very least, a constitutional challenge requiring fundamental institutional 
reforms.
68
 It is, in essence, a catalyst for a ‘new normalcy’ in the Eurozone area.   
 
The 2008 Financial Crisis: The Irish Experience 
Prior to, and in addition to the FCT, many EU member states had to introduce domestic 
measures to combat the financial crises they were facing. Ireland’s response to its acute 
economic crisis provides an illustrative example of deference to and conferral of power on 
the executive in such perceived exceptional economic circumstances. While the Irish 
economy began to stutter from late 2007, it was the events of the night of 29 September 2008 
that crystallised the recession, heralded the death of the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy, and 
triggered emergency economic responses in Ireland.
69
 On that night, taken by surprise and 
struck by feeling the necessity to act, the then Irish Government decided to guarantee all 
deposits and liabilities of six Irish financial institutions following a meeting with high level 
officials from the impaired banks.
70
 This decision was taken so quickly that the European 
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Central Bank (ECB) was informed only minutes before the public announcement.
71
 The 
following day, the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 was presented to the 
Oireachtas (the Irish bicameral legislature) for ratification. The Irish government argued that 
the guarantee was necessary to restore confidence in Irish banks that were suffering from a 
liquidity, as distinct from a solvency, crisis.
72
 The guarantee, worth greater than twice the 
then GDP of Ireland (€190bn) was expedited through the Oireachtas and was signed into law 
on 17 October 2008.
73
  It subsequently transpired that the financial institutions were insolvent 
and to date the state has injected an estimated €64.1 billion into Irish banks.74   
 
The collapse in Ireland’s banking sector also played a significant role in the deterioration of 
the Irish State’s public finances, resulting in a so-called ‘sovereign debt crisis’. Lack of 
investor confidence in Ireland’s ability to continue servicing its national debt resulted in a 
spike in bond yield rates to levels considered unsustainable.
75
 In November 2010, as a result 
of these unsustainable rates, Ireland entered into an ‘Economic Adjustment Programme’ with 
the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) providing loans to the Irish State at rates less 
than the market demanded rate with conditions pertaining to macro-economic adjustments to 
be undertaken by the Irish state attached.
76
 This ‘economic adjustment programme’ again 
illustrates how the response to an economic crisis spills over into the everyday regulation of 
the state’s financial affairs, with measures introduced by the Irish government to tackle its 
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deficit, like a property tax and household charges for water consumption clearly not meant to 
be temporary.  
 
Following Ireland’s entry into this economic adjustment programme, the Oireachtas passed 
the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010 (CISA 2010).
77
 The Act gave the Minister for 
Finance the authority to issue various orders pertaining to the restructuring of financial 
institutions without the need of legislative assent, i.e. by executive decree.
78
 The scope of 
these powers was decried by the opposition, with Pat Rabbitte TD (Teachta Dála; Member of 
Parliament) acerbically asking the Minister for Finance why he wanted to be a one-man 
legislature.
79
 Rabbitte’s colleague, then Labour Party spokesperson on finance Joan Burton 
TD argued that the powers contained in s.53 of the act allowed the Minister for Finance to 
rule by ministerial diktat.
80
 Even government aligned TDs expressed concern at the scope of 
the legislation, with Fianna Fáíl TD Ned O’ Keeffe describing the CISA 2010 as a frightening 
piece of legislation, more dramatic than the Special Powers Act you’d only find in Cuba or 
North Korea’.81 The CISA 2010, which consisted of 77 sections, passed through the Dáil 
(lower house) after just four hours of debate.
82
 The then Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan 
justified the expedition of the enactment of the CISA 2010 and effective relegation of the 
legislature to rubber-stamping the will of the executive on a number of grounds: firstly, it 
would demonstrate to the international community Ireland’s efforts at tackling its financial 
crisis;
83
 secondly, the ‘clear benefit of having the necessary powers available to the Minister 
for Finance at the earliest possible stage’; and finally, the ‘imperative of empowering the 
Minister for Finance with the statutory authority to ensure all [our] institutions are in 
conformity with regulatory capital requirements set by the Central Bank of Ireland at the end 
of this year [2010]’.84 S.69 (1) of the CISA 2010 contained a clause ‘sunsetting’ the Act on 
31 December 2012. The temporary duration of the act reinforced its status as an exceptional 
emergency response. That conceded, s.69(2) stated that ‘Notwithstanding the cessation in 
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effect of this Act, any order or requirement made under it continues to have effect according 
to its terms.’ In December 2012, the Oireachtas passed a motion to extend the period of 
effectiveness of the CISA 2010 by deleting the time limit of 31 December 2012 and 
introducing a new sunset clause of 31 December 2014.
85
 The CISA 2010 was not renewed 
beyond this; however, the system of banking regulation did not return to the status quo that 
existed prior to the enactment of the CISA 2010. Instead, the principal reason why the powers 
were not renewed was due to the enactment of European Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) which had a transposition date of 31 December 2014.
86
 
 
The above illustrative examples of state-level and international responses to economic crises 
mirror closely the responses taken in times of the archetypal national security emergency.
87
 
States utilised exceptional measures that would not have been contemplated in ordinary 
circumstances, and did so in an expedient fashion. Despite these similarities between 
responses to economic crises and national security emergencies, however; the assumptions 
that underpin these responses – their necessity and the requirement of an expedient response 
– warrant a closer analysis and further stress-testing.  
 
3. QUESTIONING DEFERENCE IN AN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Constructing a typology of emergency powers based on the phenomena that trigger them may 
be of limited use for critical academic inquiry. Such a typology could be counter-productive 
due to the evolving nature of crises and the additional problems or unrest that may erupt after 
the initial triggering event. A war, for example, could have economic consequences; and vice 
versa. However, it is also possible that the phenomenon that triggers the emergency response 
– whether de facto or de jure – warrants its own unique response. Responses to a national 
security crisis will be fundamentally different from those in a period of economic crisis; 
however, as discussed above, the procedures through which such measures are introduced – 
through executive supremacy – are strikingly similar. The use of political rhetoric to equate 
economic crises to war further corroborates the need to inquire into this equivalence that is 
drawn and whether the assumptions that underlie legislative deference to the executive in a 
national security emergency – the greater expertise of the executive and the necessity issue – 
                                                 
85
 219 (11) Sen Debs (18 December 2012).  
86
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
87
 text to n 53 above.  
20 
 
also arise in a period of economic crisis. On a wider note, the capacity of economic states of 
emergency to be conceptualised as exceptional aberrations from the status quo capable of 
being quarantined from ‘normalcy’ also requires greater scrutiny.  
 
The expertise of the executive on economic issues? 
As stated previously, legislative and judicial deference to the executive on matters of national 
security is justified by the ability of the executive to decide in an expedient manner and the 
perceived expertise the executive has to make such decisions. Like in crises pertaining to 
national security, the judiciary is often considered an inappropriate branch to decide upon 
issues of economic policy due to the lack of expertise they have in making decisions 
pertaining to macro-economic policy and the legitimacy of such electorally salient issues 
dependent upon democratically responsible decision-makers.
88
  
 
In contrast to courts, the evolution of the power of the UK Parliament is integrally linked to 
its role as scrutiniser of Crown expenditure. The celebrated Magna Carta, for example, 
precluded the Crown from collecting taxes or levies, save with the assent of his Royal 
Council. It was this Royal Council that eventually evolved into the English Parliament. In the 
aftermath of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, Parliament restricted the power of their 
preferred King William III further, precluding the Crown from maintaining an army or raise 
taxes without Parliament’s permission.89 Today, in most liberal-democratic states, economic 
policy and the levying of taxes proceeds on interplay between the executive and legislative 
branches, with the judiciary having little say on such matters. The legislature therefore is seen 
as having the competence to have input on economic issues, exercising an important 
scrutinising and legitimising role. This raises the question of whether such a role ought to be 
exercised during an economic state of emergency.  
 
Economic crises and information 
To recap, in national security crises, classified information that the executive is privy to acts 
as a strong reason for the legislature to accede to the executive’s assessment of what ought to 
be done. Economic crises are, however, substantially different. Economic crises are, 
                                                 
88
 International Transport Rother GmbH (n 42); Sinnott v Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 545, 710 
(Hardiman J). The role of the judiciary in protecting and vindicating socio-economic rights is beyond the scope 
of this article. The claims made in this paper therefore are exclusively reserved to the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature.  
89
R Masterman and C Murray, Exploring Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson, 2013) 240-241. 
21 
 
according to Posner and Vermeule, essentially crises of investor confidence. Dealing 
principally with financial crises, Posner and Vermeule define these as instances where 
‘people stop extending credit to other people because they fear that the loans will not be 
repaid’.90 Such crises of confidence are triggered by information investors have about market 
conditions. The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that markets are essentially based upon 
information, with prices in ‘strong information efficiency markets’ based upon publically 
available information.
91
 Individuals make choices based on the information that they have. It 
is for this reason that publicly listed companies are obliged to produce quarterly reports 
outlining their performances in order to allow shareholders and potential shareholders to 
make decisions regarding their future involvement with the company. Relatedly, individuals 
privy to commercially sensitive information are prohibited from acting according to this 
information. Such insider trading is seen as unfair to other investors who do not have access 
to such information as well as being potentially damaging to the company.  
 
When a financial crisis occurs, it is indicated in the market data, e.g. a fall in stock prices, the 
drying up of credit etc. Again, such data is openly available. It is this information and the 
negative content or forecasts that it suggests that can trigger ‘crises of confidence’ and 
consequently economic crises.   According to this concept of markets and financial crises, the 
idea that the executive is privy to sensitive information that members of the legislature do not 
have access to does not arise in an ‘economic state of emergency’ as the information about a 
crisis is readily available to the public at large and therefore the legislature too. It follows that 
the executive would not be privy to inside information in a market with ‘strong information 
efficiency’ and thus there is no reason to assume it has an expertise or advantage in assessing 
how the state ought to react.  
 
Indeed, it is the reaction of the markets to this publicly available information that causes or at 
least perpetuates the crisis.
92
 In the past, an ordinary person could get a stock market price 
each morning from the newspapers. This ‘snap shot in time’ changed, however, with 
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television, 24 hour news channels, and most recently the internet. Access to real-time stock 
information is now readily available permitting anybody with an interest to react based upon 
the most up to date information they have access to. The increased proliferation of this 
information and the more efficient manner in which individuals can react to it accelerates 
economic crises in modernity faster than before. This raises further questions regarding the 
increasing speed at which economic crises erupt today and the corresponding narrowing of 
the window of opportunity within which a decision-maker can react. Consequently, for the 
legislature to defer to the executive on the grounds that the executive has greater expertise 
than the legislature on economic issues is not grounded upon any real basis when discussing a 
market with strong information efficiency.  
 
Weak information efficiency and economic crises 
A scenario may arise where an impending crisis may be foreseen on the basis of 
commercially sensitive information not disclosed to the public. The government, being privy 
to such sensitive information after being briefed by individuals with inside information, seeks 
to act upon this to initiate an emergency response to temper or prevent an economic crisis. In 
other words, the market in this scenario is demonstrating weak information efficiency and the 
executive wishes to capitalise upon it.
93
  In such instances the executive may be able to claim 
a certain degree of expertise over the legislature. An example of this may be seen from 
Ireland’s decision to guarantee the vast majority of liabilities in its banking system in 
September 2008.  
 
The decision to guarantee Irish banks by the then government was taken after a late night 
meeting with representatives from the impaired banks. Then Minister for Finance Brian 
Lenihan further stated that the Irish government’s decision to issue such a guarantee was also 
informed by advice from the Governor of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator.
94
 
The guarantee was then presented to the Oireachtas by the government as a solution to a 
liquidity problem in six Irish financial institutions.
95
 However, as stated previously, it 
ultimately transpired that the financial institutions in question did in fact have a solvency 
problem. 
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The plan to introduce the banking guarantee was initially supported by all parties in the 
Oireachtas with the exception of the Labour Party, which preferred nationalisation.
96
 This 
cross-party support was achieved by the Irish Government successfully convincing the 
Oireachtas that a liquidity problem existed in Irish banks. The Government presented itself as 
being privy to sensitive information and possessing special expertise that the Oireachtas did 
not have access to; consequently, the Oireachtas deferred to this expertise.
97
 Hindsight has 
shown, however, that this special information was incorrect; catastrophically so, in fact. It is 
not clear whether those lobbying the Government deliberately misled it regarding the extent 
of their problems or whether they genuinely believed they had only a liquidity problem. What 
is clear, however, is the special information which the Government and ultimately the 
Oireachtas relied upon in making their decision was incorrect. In contrast, commentators such 
as Morgan Kelly had previously, and up to the very night that the guarantee was announced, 
argued that Irish banks and the economy as a whole faced a potentially catastrophic solvency 
crisis.
98
 Using publically available data, and basing his analysis on previous historical 
property market crashes, Kelly argued that the Irish property market was facing a similar 
crisis.
99
 Ireland’s late-night decision on the bank guarantee and the resultant cost of it stands 
as an example of how legislatures are placed in a difficult situation when the executive claims 
that it is privy to sensitive or non-public information regarding the economy. Even with such 
inside information, debate may still rage over the correct course of action to be taken and 
whether such information can be relied upon. Of course, the evidence pertaining to a national 
security emergency may also be contested; however, this argument should be directed 
towards enhanced legislative scrutiny in a national security emergency.  
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Economic crises: beyond investor confidence 
While Posner and Vermeule’s definition of an economic crisis is based on ‘investor 
confidence’ and crises afflicting financial markets, the post-2008 economic crises facing 
Ireland, Greece, and Cyprus (amongst) others cannot be solely be accommodated under this 
definition. While Ireland’s crisis may have started out as such, the concern was not merely 
that private institutions described as being of ‘systemic importance’ were in danger of being 
liquidated; it morphed into a sovereign debt crisis where the solvency of the state itself was 
threatened. The measures taken by the state to respond to this economic emergency were not 
limited to exceptional encroachments into the regulation of private companies, but instead 
required adjustments to the finances of the states themselves. The ordinary budgetary 
decisions of the state thus had to be altered to confront this sovereign debt crisis. These 
adjustments, for example, the measures taken by successive Irish Governments in line with 
memoranda of understanding agreed with the Troika do not correlate with this classic 
understanding of emergency responses as ‘fire-fighting’ in nature. Instead, both the 
emergency measures and the phenomenon itself seep into normalcy itself. New found fiscal 
discipline is not something to be cast aside once the crisis has abated but becomes the norm 
itself, as concretised in the provisions of the FCT. It therefore seeps into the ordinary role of 
the legislature: to act as a check on the executive’s assessment of how state finances should 
be raised and allocated.   
 
Necessity in economic crises: A constrained choice? 
The above claims to executive supremacy in an economic crisis assume that expertise, or the 
executive’s expertise, produces the best decision with regards to what action should be taken. 
Assessment of what is the ‘best’ decision, however, requires agreed parameters of what 
makes a ‘good’ decision in the first instance before such a discussion can take place. Such 
agreed parameters are noticeably absent in economic discourse, i.e. there is often a 
fundamental, irreconcilable disagreement as to what ought to be done to rectify an economic 
crisis. This gives rise to further problems for executive supremacy: that of the necessity of 
deference.  
 
As stated previously, the necessity of exceptional emergency measures is fundamental to 
justify departing from normalcy, i.e. that there is no real choice but to take such measures.
100
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In national security crises, a convergence in political opinion often results and exceptional 
encroachments on human rights and other safeguards or democratic procedures may be 
acquiesced to with minimal resistance from political opponents, at least at the outset of the 
emergency.
101
 While there may be some differences as to the degree to which such rights 
ought to be sacrificed in order to preserve security or the best approach to tackle the crisis; 
nevertheless, a certain modicum of restriction is generally agreed upon. In this instance, there 
is a general convergence in opinion on both the left and right that state security interests 
ought to be advanced at the expense of individual liberty.
102
 This convergence of opinion is 
potentially symptomatic of a degree of objectivity of the ‘necessity’ of decision-making in a 
national security crisis; i.e. to use Agamben’s terminology, that the ends to be achieved by 
the claim to necessity are agreed upon by both the left and the right. That stated, this 
consensus may also arise for more malevolent reasons such as the potential to gain electorally 
from a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that can be seen in national security crises.103 It is 
because of this convergence of opinion amongst political actors that de Londras argues in 
favour of judicial defence of rights in a period of national security crisis, due to the 
legislature’s reluctance to push back against the executive.104 
 
A convergence of opinion on economic issues?  
In contrast to national security emergencies, the political sphere is more divided on economic 
issues. Even during a so-called economic state of emergency, the left and right may have 
wholly irreconcilable, antithetical solutions to the crisis at hand; for example, whether to 
increase or decrease state spending. In the current crisis, this may be seen in the debate 
between Keynesian economists such as Paul Krugman arguing for increased state spending 
during a recession and the ‘austerity’ approach advocated by the EU, requiring Eurozone 
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member states to balance their budgets by contracting expenditure and increasing taxes.
105
 
Others may go so far as to completely reject the notion of even doing anything at all; instead 
preferring a policy of non-intervention, even in times of crisis. The convergence of opinion 
seen in national security crises as a result of the perceived necessity of such measures thus 
does not occur in an economic state of emergency.  Indeed, debate still rages today as to 
whether the New Deal policies of Roosevelt ended or perpetuated the great depression.  
 
This lack of agreement may be explained by what Lon Fuller terms the ‘polycentric’ nature 
of economic disputes.
106
 Polycentric disputes ‘comprise a large and complicated web of 
interdependent relationships, such that a change to one factor produces an incalculable series 
of changes to other factors.’107 While the target of Fuller’s article was the judiciary and the 
appropriate role of adjudication, the polycentric nature of a dispute should also be relevant 
when assessing whether the legislature ought to defer to the executive. Similarly, the lack of 
agreed consensus on economic issues led John Rawls to argue that civil disobedience should 
never be deployed against fiscal decisions.
108
 Given the nature of the range of variables 
involved in polycentric disputes pertaining to economic choices, Rawls contended that it 
would be incredibly difficult to adduce a moral argument in favour of civil disobedience 
against a fiscal decision that would trump the moral validity of the rule of law in a liberal 
democratic state.  
 
To say therefore that an economic crisis constrains choice to an extent that such an option 
was ‘necessary’, ought to be viewed with scepticism as a result of the polycentric nature of 
the disputes involved and the resultant lack of consensus that arises with regards to what 
ought to be done. Instead, the subjective nature of necessity is particularly heightened with 
regards to economic crises.  Such necessity, to use Agamben’s language, is ‘relative to the 
aim that one wants to achieve’ and therefore reflective of the ideology of the decision-maker. 
This may be particularly divergent from others’ to a degree not seen in national security 
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emergencies. A claim to necessity for a certain course of economic action is instead a claim 
that an individual’s subjective assessment of what ought to be done should trump the 
normative value of the democratic processes which the vast majority of participants in the 
political system would attribute a degree of value to. A claim to necessity in economic crises 
cloaks the executive’s subjective ideology in the objective language of necessity. Thus Paul 
O’Connell argues that most successful ruse of neo-liberal dominance in both global and 
domestic affairs is the definition of economic policy as primarily a matter of neutral, 
technical expertise.
109
 These claims in a parliamentary democracy manifest themselves 
through the use of strict whipping systems or guillotining debate time. This undermines the 
procedural legitimacy of the measures taken, an aspect of fundamental importance given the 
polycentric nature of the disputes in question.  
 
Entrenching subjective perspectives into normalcy 
The broad spectrum of opinions on economic policy means that at the very least, the most 
legitimate answer as to what should be done should be left to bodies with the democratic 
legitimacy to do so.
110
 Indeed, the whole purpose of the structure of legislatures is that they 
facilitate debate on these contested issues. Waldron, for example, describes disagreement on 
matters of principle to be ‘not the exception but the rule in politics.’111 Ideally, legislatures 
are designed to enable debate by those of various ideological perspectives, to glean a 
cumulative understanding of the issues involved or to compare and contrast alternative 
perspectives.  Of course, it is often the case – particularly so in parliamentary democracies 
that operate a party whipping system – that after debate, a cumulative understanding or 
compromise approach is not possible. Furthermore, the irrationality of popular debate that 
Scheuerman argues is endemic of parliaments today acts as an additional critique of this ideal 
understanding of how parliaments operate.
112
 Nevertheless, adequate time to debate is, it is 
submitted, necessary in order to bestow the requisite procedural legitimacy on the measures 
enacted, even if that measure ultimately stems from the executive’s intention.113 Legislatures 
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therefore aim at reaching a legitimate settlement in areas of contestation as distinct from a 
negotiated agreement. Every legislator or member of the public may not be convinced to 
change their minds with regard to the correct course of action; however, the procedural 
principles underpinning the debate should suffice to legitimise the decision taken.  
 
As stated previously, however, the 20
th
 Century has been characterised by what Moravcsik 
describes as the ‘decline of parliaments’.114 While Fuller’s ‘polycentric disputes’ concept can 
be used to argue for a legitimising input from the legislature, it also potentially contains an 
implicit theory of the decline of parliament. Some polycentric disputes, Fuller notes, are 
potentially resolved through managerial discretion as distinct from majority voting.
115
 Even 
where disagreement as to what ought to be done is resolved through a voting body such as a 
parliament, the options must be simplified considerably first before being put to a vote. An 
accommodation of interests must be reached and parliamentary methods, such as a ‘political 
deal’ struck between party leaders utilised in order to construct this simplified question that 
can then be voted upon. Recognition of the potential of managerial discretion to resolve 
polycentric disputes thus paves the way for the rise of the executive or the administrative 
state where experts take decisions in areas where the legislature has delegated competence 
to.
116
 The legislature is thus reduced to rubber-stamping decisions that have already been 
made,  
 
This rubber-stamping role and the decline of parliaments has arguably been exacerbated by 
the increased globalised nature of governance. International affairs are, generally speaking, 
within the competence of the executive and the increased regulation from the globalised 
sphere is negotiated by the executive and vested interests in a particular area. Increased 
globalisation has thus also led to the rise of unelected decision-makers based on their 
expertise. In particular, the EU has been subject to intense criticism regarding the democratic 
deficit at its heart. Follesdal and Hix argue that European integration has meant an increase in 
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executive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control.
117
 In particular, 
governments can effectively ignore their national parliaments when making decisions in 
Brussels.
118
 Moravcsik, writing in 2006, defended this democratic deficit on a number of 
grounds, arguing, in particular, that there were sufficient degrees of democratic input into the 
EU to render it legitimate.
119
 Furthermore, he cautioned against measures to further enhance 
democratic input on the grounds that the work of EU organisations is generally of low 
‘electoral salience’ for voters.120 However, the Eurozone crisis threating the future of the 
Euro and the measures the EU sought to impose on member states does question the 
continued relevance of Moravcsik’s point on this issue. The policy decisions taken at EU 
level to confront this economic crisis, the correlating budgetary measures taken by many 
member states, and the resultant outbreak of public protests and volatility of electorates show 
that these policies are certainly not of ‘low electoral salience’.  
 
Executive dominance in financial crises is therefore linked to its institutional competence to 
conduct international affairs. An increasingly globalised and inter-connected world is further 
facilitating this ‘decline of parliament.’ This decline cannot be limited to periods of 
emergency. It is instead a permanent feature of modernity that is recalibrating the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature in normalcy too. Even when measures to increase 
national parliamentary oversight of the EU are introduced, such as in the Lisbon treaty, Chiti 
and Teixeira argue that the response of European states to the Eurocrisis has seen a 
jettisoning of EU institutions and EU channels of regulation and negotiation. The ‘Union 
method’ of solving the crisis was seen as requiring too much ceding of sovereignty to the EU, 
and so responses to the crisis were increasingly intergovernmental.
121
 This international 
component of financial regulation thus adds a further cloaking layer to the subjective 
assessment of what ought to be done in an economic crisis.  
 
Expedient decision-making in a period of economic crisis 
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Integral to Waldron’s concept of the dignity of legislatures is that there is ample time for 
debate to legitimise the decision.
122
 As stated previously, however, a fundamental element of 
the emergency paradigm is the concept of an expedient response. This requirement for 
expedience results in the legislature deferring to the executive by expediting emergency 
legislation or resolutions. However, while it is conceded that expediency is an integral 
element of the emergency paradigm, when dealing with economic decision-making, this 
claim for expediency is not exceptional. 
 
Capitalism’s traditionally preferred mode of governance was liberal democracy, whether it is 
presidential or parliamentary in its design. As liberalism is essentially about individual 
freedom and capitalism about freedom to engage in markets, this inter-relation between 
liberalism and capitalism appears as prima facie synergistic. Indeed, liberalism has been 
termed ‘bourgeois’ due to its content and its origin; being primarily advocated by the rising 
merchant classes in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
123
 Capitalism’s and 
indeed liberalism’s alliance with democracy is, however, not as clear-cut. Originally, 
liberalism aligned with democracy as a theory of legitimacy in order for the rising merchant 
classes to wrest power from the then hegemonic noble classes.
124
 Liberalism’s relationship 
with democracy is, however, not guaranteed, with fundamental contradictions forcefully 
argued by scholars such as Carl Schmitt. Liberalism, according to Schmitt, is private ideology 
dealing with the relation between individuals and their property.
125
 However, in order to 
properly protect these ideals liberalism must make a ‘pact’ with parliamentary democracy and 
enter the public sphere.
126
 Once it enters the public sphere, liberalism privatises it, making it 
vulnerable to the interests of all other private interest groups. Liberalism’s proposed claim to 
‘neutrality’ between these differing private factions leaves it incapable of defending itself 
against those who use this privatisation of the public sphere as a sledgehammer against 
liberalism itself.
127
 It is therefore possible to have illiberal democracies or at least illiberal 
regimes that claim democratic legitimacy. Indeed, capitalism itself can now be seen as 
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divorced from liberalism. China’s embrace of capitalism and economic growth has not seen a 
corresponding growth in personal freedom of its citizens or democratisation of its institutions.  
 
A further integral element of a liberal democracy – the rule of law – is also dependent upon a 
slow rate of change. While avoiding a universally accepted definition, the rule of law in 
generally considered to require that laws be clear and prescribed beforehand so that 
individuals know what the law is and can conduct their affairs accordingly.
128
 Legislation is 
therefore forward looking: it prescribes what ought to be done, not what should have been 
done. Legal norms must be prescribed first in order for them to be effective: one cannot 
discern what one ought to do if such prescriptions are not already in place. Correspondingly, 
the legislature is ‘past orientated’ as its prescriptions come from the past to effect the present 
and the future.
129
  
 
The legal system of a liberal democratic state therefore has two factors that necessitate ample 
time for the creation of new norms: time to debate and review the laws that are to be created 
to ensure their content and prescriptions are meritorious; and time between their inception 
and application to ensure that such application is legitimate from the perspective of the rule 
of law. As stated previously, however, emergencies put temporal pressure on decision-
making by constraining dramatically the period in which the state has time to decide what 
ought to be done. For this reason the legislature defers to the executive’s assessment of the 
situation about what should be done to confront the crisis at hand.  
 
While Albert Einstein famously demonstrated that time is relative, the changing nature of the 
perception of time as stated by a number of social theorists can be felt at a much more 
tangible level in society. According to ‘time compression theory’ our perception of time, 
rather than being fixed, is necessarily dependent upon the epoch and society we live in.
130
 
The faster the pace of life within this society, the faster our perception of time. Time can 
therefore be seen as analogous to money: its value is predicated upon what can be achieved 
with a fixed quantum. However, whereas a pound or a dollar today would buy noticeably less 
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than a pound or dollar in 1900, the opposite is true for what can be achieved in an hour in 
2014 than in an hour in 1900. Advances in technology have increased economic productivity 
and made commuting long distances faster. This ‘time deflation’ has therefore, from an 
economic perspective, made an hour today much more valuable than an hour in 1900. 
Relatedly, with the help of technology, greater distances can now be traversed in a much 
shorter period of time. This has led therefore to the compression of space as much as to a 
compression of time. A 20 mile journey by foot or by horse seems much shorter when it can 
be taken by rail or by car. Conception of distance is therefore equally dependent upon the 
epoch and society we live in.
131
  
 
Compression theory in economic affairs presents a challenge to liberal democratic states. As 
time is needed for the wheels of the liberal-democratic state to churn, time deflation 
heightens the consequences of a delayed response and thus increases the perceived 
requirement for an expedient choice of action. The compression of space also has an added 
effect of increasing the impact zone of a disaster. While the immediate effects of a natural 
disaster such as an earthquake may still be felt by the same radius from the epicentre as they 
always have been, the political reverberations of such an earthquake are felt further away by 
virtue of the response it predicates. Knowledge and information of the earthquake can spread 
all around the globe and a response effort can be co-ordinated beyond local parameters. 
Space compression can also exacerbate the perception and impact of a crisis beyond its initial 
‘ground zero’. The spread of disease as a result of international travel, for example, is a 
challenge the World Health Organisation faces as evidenced by the proliferation of the H1N1 
influenza virus that spread throughout the globe.
132
 Military and other violent crises are also 
exacerbated by time and space compression. The proliferation of long range weapons, for 
example, has increased the geographical parameters of areas affected by such weapons. 
Relatedly, the speed at which such devastating weapons can be deployed is also a cause for 
concern. States can now launch military missions from thousands of miles away with the 
threat of the deployment of such weapons ever present.
133
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Of the various different types of phenomena that can trigger an emergency response in a 
state, crises that are economic in nature are those that are most affected by the compression of 
time and space. The increased speed of the capitalist market, coupled with the compression of 
space presents a fundamental challenge to the liberal democratic state that assumes ample 
time is available for it to make laws and apply them in accordance with rule of law principles 
and the separation of powers. However, such time and space compression is not experienced 
only during an economic crisis. Rather, it is symptomatic of the modern capitalist state. It is a 
permanent not an exceptional challenge that the state faces. Consequently, the idea that 
ordinary democratic procedures should be departed from would also not be temporary but 
permanent. It presents a permanent challenge to liberal democracy and the need for time that 
produces substantively better, but more importantly, morally, legally, and politically 
legitimate norms. Deferring to, or broad delegation of power to the executive therefore 
becomes not an exceptional approach but one that would be permanently required for the 
management of the economy. The examples from Ireland delineated above, and of the finding 
of the Church-Matthias Committee pertaining to the prolific use of emergency powers by the 
US president in economic affairs suggests that this is a change that is already occurring and 
has progressed significantly.
134
 Permanent changes introduced into the structure of the 
Eurozone by the FCT further indicates that the response to the 2008 economic crisis viewed 
‘normalcy’ as existed prior to the economic emergency as part of the problem. Normalcy if it 
is to be restored will therefore not look like the status quo that existed before the crisis as this 
is represented as part of the problem that caused the economic state of emergency in the first 
instance. Instead, the Eurozone crisis, and indeed economic crises tend to usher in ‘new 
normalcies’ where the mistakes of the past cannot be repeated. Permanent changes as a result 
of an economic state of emergency are therefore replete.   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In general, the emergency paradigm has becoming an increasingly contested concept in the 
literature, particularly due to the assumption the paradigm makes in the ability to separate 
normalcy from emergency. Economic crises and the measures taken on foot of such crises 
have a particular tendency to seep into normalcy. Economic states of emergency therefore are 
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not reactive and defensive but instead seem to be transformative, viewing the status quo that 
existed prior to the crisis as part of the problem that needs to be tackled. The classic 
justification of emergency measures – that they are self-defeating and seek to restore 
normalcy – is thus very weak when applied to economic crises.  
 
The strongest correlation between economic crises and the emergency paradigm occurs in the 
area of restricted time. With time and space compression amplified in the area of economic 
affairs of capitalist states, pressure is ratcheted up and the window of opportunity within 
which a decision-maker can act becomes narrower. Governments may therefore feel they 
must make a swift decision and so ought to have the capacity to do so. The idea that it is 
‘necessary’ for them to take action must, however, be recognised as a subjective claim and 
the legislature should be loath to defer to the executive’s assessment.  
 
In light of this, do economic crises justify deferring to the government? Three factors militate 
against such deference: the ‘weak necessity’ argument, the lack of superior expertise of the 
executive in matters regarding economic regulation, and the inability to quarantine such a 
side-lining of the legislature to exceptional situations as it is instead symptomatic of the 
decline of parliaments in modernity. In contrast, one factor weighs in favour of such 
deference: the time and space compression experienced by the modern capitalist state that the 
ordinary trappings of law and decision-making in a liberal democratic society can potentially 
not cope with. Do arguments against deference trump those in favour of it, or vice versa? Of 
course, a lot will depend upon each individual crisis at hand as consensus on what course of 
action should be taken fluctuates. However, arguments regarding deference to the 
government in periods of economic emergency are considerably weaker than those in periods 
of national security crises or responding to natural disasters. Consequently, notwithstanding 
this perception of urgency, deference to the executive during an economic crisis should be 
treated with scepticism.   
 
 
 
